Rayburn - Iraq After America [acd3a73c]
1. Forward
1. Forward
- "American police action has largely been defined by hoping something turns up to end the conflict"
2. Chapter 1
2. Chapter 1
- Dawa was modeled after the muslim brotherhood
- Largely driven underground by Saddam
- Born out of young clerics from najaf in 1959-1960, elders adopted a mostly quietest stance
- Born out of a desire to drive back communism's appeal
- Originally cross-sectarian
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Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr wrote the treatises that became the core
- Presented Hegel/Marx with Islam as a viable alternative to communism and capitalism
- Musa Sadr (BIL and older cousin to Baqir) founded the amal movement in lebanon
- 3 Sadr's fostered people conversant in Marxism to promote Islam
- Dawa armed uprising in 1977
- Split into exiles in lebanon, iran, and the west
3. Chapter 2
3. Chapter 2
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- Not from a clerical family
- largely middle tier functionary between 2003-2006
- Captapulted into the scene by Khalizad
- Maliki's ascendence set against the backdrop of the al-Qaeda bombing in Samarra
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Muqtada al-Sadr withdrew his ministers in 2007 following the troop surge
- Maliki survived with a coalition of Shia and Kurdish parties
- Mahidi and Barzani attempted to secure a no-confidence vote, but could not get the green light from Iran or the US
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August 2007
- Sadrist militias attached solders guarding the Imam Hussein Shrine in Kerbala
- Maliki's response garnered him immense popular support
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Shia militias in 2007 broke out into civil war
- Especially over control of basra
- March 24, 2008 - Maliki begins the "Charge of the Knights" offensive in basra
- April 5, 2008 - Sunni and Kurdish political parties throw their weight behind Maliki instead of the Muqtada al-Sadr's party, political and military victory followed
- May 20, 2008 - Sadrists capitualted to Iraq army's occupation of Sadr city
- Kut captured from Sadrists in March
- Amarra captured in June
- Ultimately broke the Sadrist control of the South
4. Chapter 3
4. Chapter 3
- sahwa (awakening) movement started in 2006 and spread in 2007
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Maliki applied the same principals in 2008 to the shia community
- Set roundtable for shia tribal leaders
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Jan 2009 provincial elections
- Stunning defeat for the 2005 political class
- Foreshadowed the 2010 elections
- Maliki negotiated the withdraw of US troops from cities in 2009, used it as a talking point
- August 19, 2009 - al-Qaeda conducts a large bombing in finance and foreign ministries within the gz (green zone)
- October 26, 2009 - al-Qaeda stages even larger attack in GZ, kills over 600 Iraqis
- March 2010 - Intensive intra-Shia competition for votes leading up the elections
- Maliki's base was largely middle-class or lower middle class voters
- Security situation of the GZ made other politicans depend on the Dawa for support
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Security apperatus of the state was folded into the Dawa
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2011 - PM's office sets up the "Office of Security and Information"
- Similar to Presidental Diwan under Saddam
- Also sets up the counterterrorism burea, giving Malki control of the special forces
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- Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud's favorable rulings granted maliki significant power
- Rival political leaders also did not oppose the centralization of the state
5. Chapter 4: The Shia Supremists
5. Chapter 4: The Shia Supremists
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badr Corps and islamic supreme council of iraq (isci) returned the same time to Iraq
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Largely did Iran's bidding
- Hunted down former pilots of the Iraqi Air Force, lead to general asylum decree in Kurdistan
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SCIRI took over mosques in Baghdad
- Lead to the UIA in 2005
- "Sanctioned" by Sistani in Dodge - Rethinking Political Identities in Iraq After 2003
- Shia played a role in cementing the autonomous regions in the iraqi constitutionalism, ideas of a "Shiaistan"
- Interim PM Jafari inducted hundreds of Badr Security officiers into ministry of interior in 2005
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Post 2005 Sunnis were largely driven out of the city
- 2004-2005 large scale sectarian cleansing
- Maliki used the health ministry and other governing bodies to be complicit in this
- Feb 2006 - Oct 2007 - UN HCR estimates 1MM baghdadis became IDP's
6. Chapter 5: The Sunni Chauvists
6. Chapter 5: The Sunni Chauvists
- Saddam embraced Sunni points in early 1990's to shore up support
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Iraqi Islamic Party
- Offshoot that disagreed with Saddam's binding of Sunnism and the state
- Later asked the Brotherhood to help for a resistance organization against Saddam in 1979-1980
- Worked with occasional other politics groups, like the Dawa
- Saddam developed a Salafi opposition to the brotherhood, binding the Baa'th and Salafism
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Saddam's plans laid the groundwork for an insurgency
- Funding was also provided by Bashar al-Assad
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2005 elections
- US wanted to capture Fallujah and Mosul before elections
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Sunnis boycotted the elections
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Major blunder, did an about face in Dec 2005, assuming Sunnis were majority of pop
- Return to violence after they did not get their desired results
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3 senior sunni politicians wanted to break the gov from within:
- Khalaf Ulayan
- Mahmoud al-Mashadani
- Adnan al-Dulaimi
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Zarqawi caused a rift in the Sunni insurgency
- Accelerated with the Samar bombing
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IS produced a three-pronged backlash
- Awakening
- Rift b/tw other jihadi groups
- growing population revolution against al-Qaeda in 2007
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2008 elections
- Awakening movement grew into a political party in Anbar
- Saleh al-Mutlaq & Tariq al-Hashimi gained mainstream following, both largely secular
- Election of Sunni groups in 2009 caused softening of jihadist stances, like in Ninewa
- Rend Rahim said pre-2003, Sunnis considered Shia's "quaint" in religious practices
7. Chapter 6: The Kurdish Maximalists
7. Chapter 6: The Kurdish Maximalists
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"Build a land bridge to syria kurdistan"
- This book leans very much towards primordialism
- PUK & KDP
- Turkomen communites within Kirkuk posed a problem
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Kirkuk's proven reserves = libya
- 145 mm barrels
- Saddam dramatically caused a demographics change in Kirkuk
- Kurds seized Kirkuk in 2003 and established the forward "green line"
- Article 140 in iraqi constitutionalism used 1957 census
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Shiek Abdul Rham Munshid al-Assi - "It is an iraqi city"
- pg 141
- What does this tell us about state level nationalism?
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Rejection of kurkds by Turkomen as well
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Sunni-Shia rift in Turkomen towns
- pg 142
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- Displaced kurds were allowed to vote in Kirkuk's 2007 elections
- PKK played its hand, Turkey's response in 2007 caused an Iraqi political crisis
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National level held issues with Kurkds and Arabs
- Local level was somewhat functioning, city council bargin struck
- Mosul's diversity caused some problems with Sunnis and Kurds
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"When power changed hands, moslawi's would not accept the new order"
- Again primordialist
- Disbanding the army had major reprecussions on Mosul
- Kurdish green line post 2003 aspirationally included places with Kurdish minority
- Sinjar was an ethnic battleground
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Assassination of Osama Kashmouks in 2004 caused Mosul to slip into insurgency
- Jihadists used Sinjar and Tel Afar as staging ground
- Shia Turkomens in Tel Afar sought protection
- Remergence of al-Qaeda in 2007 in Ninew and mosul
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1 million christians in 2003 to 1/2 mil in 2010 in Iraq
- Used as pawns b/w kurds and sunni politicians
- Lawless, but groups largely bought into the Iraqi state
- KDP ruled Mosul from 2003-2008, failed to bring it propserity like Irbil
- Dawa and Maliki became referes in Sunni/Kurdish Dispute
8. Chapter 7: The Shia "resistance" [5933ea90]
8. Chapter 7: The Shia "resistance" [5933ea90]
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Sadrists ballooned into a "resistance" axis
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Sadiq Sadr employed same methods as muslim brotherhood, attracted smart students to study religion under him
- His movement outlasted him
- Invasion was broadly not aware of the Sadrist movement in 2003
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3 groups fought for Najaf in 2003
- Hakim and SCIRI
- Sadrists
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Clerical Establishment
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Run by Abdul Majid al-Khoei
- Abdul Majid's killing would haunt Muqtada al-Sadr
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- Jaysh akmahdi represented a mobilization of lower-class shias
- Movement in 2004 lead to the spintering
- Insurgents had issues with Muqtada's leadership, driving them towards Qassem Solemani
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SCIRI and Badrists were too close to the US for Iran in 2004, Sadrists presented a good counterweight
- Lebeanese hzbollah were useful staging ground
- Muhandis capitalized on the Sadrists split
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3 later groups
- Muqtada groups
- AAH, worked with Quds
- KH
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2006-7
- Maliki took advantage of the Sadrist split, tried to build AAH as an alternative to Muqtada al-Sadr
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sistani was a target
- Iranians
- Strange cults such as Soldiers of the Heart
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Sadrists aimed to follow hezbollah's example of creating a state within a state by capturing key ministries
- Health, Water, Transportation, etc
- Muhandis moved freely within Quds force
- MEK - Mujahdeen -e Kalq
9. Chapter 8: 2010-2013
9. Chapter 8: 2010-2013
- 2009 parlimentary election depended on the polarization of the party
- Maliki went back to being a Shia champion
- de-Baathification committee barred over 500 members from running
- Iraqiyah party ran virtually unopposed in Sunni areas, and attracted secular Shias
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Maliki asked for Medhat to interpret the consitution to allow "any" party with 163 MP's to become the first
- Lead to a 9 month deadlock
- Ended with the Irbil power sharing agreement
- Maliki cracked down on Sunni rivals in 2011 with security forces against an Arab Spring like event
- Attempted to arrest Vice President Hasimi, lead to him seeking refuge in Istanbul
- Maliki fractured the cross sectarian Iraqiyah by poaching Sunni MP's
- Attempted a no-confidence vote, failed to rally
- Syria's politics cast a long pall over Iraqi politics
- Hollowing out of the Sunni moderate by Maliki gave way to AQ and IS, with a new civil war in 2013