tel afar

iraq

• Taken back from islamic state (is/isis/isil) in 2017 by a combination of hashd al-shaabi (PMF) and TMF, lead by Brigade 53 - Liwa Hussain
• Sunnis in town feel a pervasive feeling of anxeity and helplessness, even though the secuirty situations have improved
• Sunni popluation prior to 2014 was 65%-75% of the city
• Many iraqi sunni from tel afar went to Turkey, the KRI, and Mosul in general
  • many of the ones who went to Turkey ar eliving decent lives off of their retirement benefits
  • Sunnis who have returned report that hayy al-Askari seems to be fine, but do not feel comfortable going out
• Most iraqi shia families have returned

2020 Tel Afar Honor Pact

• Signed by a number of local tribal and community leaders with state reps
• Has sunni community leaders, but they do not endorse the text itself
• Major point of contention with sunnis in tel afar

Sectarianism

• Ambiguity of who gets to return, textual statement is that “ISIS supporters” are not allowed, but munasir has zero legal basis or clear definition
• sectarianism tensions are largely embedded within the pre-existing political and tribal spaces
• Sayyid Wahab and Cholagh tribes, which have taken over the city, are blamed for large part of the problems
• Only two Sunni mukhtars left as of 2021
• about 1/3 houses in Sunni neighborhoods are up for sale
  • الدار معروض البيع - house for sale
• fundalmentally different than Sinjar, where gulity and responsiblity is largely undisputed
  • yazidis are undisputed as victims
  • tel afar is far more complex and polarized

ISF Concerns

• Post 2003, Ismail Farris a Turkmen shia from Sayyid Wahab tribe was placed in command of the Tel Afar pllice and dismissed 440 Sunni policement
• Tel Afar continued to be a base for al-Qaeda in 2004-2005, and from 2004 to 2014, Shias were unable to travel to mosul
• 2008 hayy al-Wahda al-Qaeda truck bomb struck the market and fueled reprisals against over 100 Sunni families

Sharik

• Possible forced profit sharing?