Murphy: United Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the Use of Force
Tags: lebanon, somalia, papers, un and global governance lecture 5
- Examines unifil and UN operations in somalia, especially wrt to the rule of engagement
- Two aspects of the use of force in peacekeeping
- Minimum use of force
- This was used (and crossed) by the somilia missions
- going after a specific actor placed the UN as “one actor among many”
- This was used (and crossed) by the somilia missions
- Force for self defense only
- UNFIL’s stand and holding villages has allowed them to maintain a pretense of neutrality
- Minimum use of force
- somalia as a testing ground for new use of force rules (chapter VII)
- UNIFIL has been awkward since the lebanese gov has depended upon it for various enforcement activities
- UNIFIL ROE has been modified to become less restricive over time, as compared to the UNPROFOR (somalia) ones, where they were very restrictive
- after May 1993, the UNOSOM II ROE was changed to become a “blank check”
- UNOSOM II ROE was largely confused and no effort was made to integrate (especially with the italians)
- incoherence of Italians, where the italians knew how to negotiate whereas the rest of the UN forces did not
- UNOSOM II ROE was largely confused and no effort was made to integrate (especially with the italians)
- UNIFIL not confronting the PLO meant that they couldn’t confront the Israeli de facto forces either
- UNIFIL stand at At-Tiri lead to the creation of Force Mobile Reserve